Some implications from the Georgia-Russia war

My speaking points at a meeting on the implications of the Georgian-Russain War.

How has the Georgian-Russian war been perceived in Europe?

In general
o It was a wake up call for the need for clear and common EU positions and decisions in relations with Russia and the Eastern neighbors.
o Also, a reminder that frozen conflicts are still conflicts and can erupt quite easily into hot conflicts.

Otherwise it depends who you ask in Europe
o for the Baltics, Poland, Czech Republic + UK and Sweden (the friends of Georgia) this was an aggression of Russia and confirmation of the re-emerging expansionists Russian Empire. For them it was a mistake not to give a NATO Map to Georgia as they believe it would have avoided this standoff. They were quick in support for Sakasvili and for calling sanctions against Russia. This group is close to the current US position.
o for the rest of the EU lead by France and Germany, the crisis was a confirmation of 3 things: that Sakasvili is an adventurer who cannot be trusted, that Russia’s un-proportionate military reaction was manifestation that Russia is back in geo-political business, that EU and NATO policies for the whole Eastern region need to be rethought. Their take was that it was wise not to give a NATO Map to Georgia.

2. What are the prospects and constraints for concerted action?

Despite these differences the EU acted quick and united with surprisingly swift crisis management by Sarkozy. A discussion is now underway on the EU’s stands towards Russia. It started off with some tough words but in the end the Realists/pro-engagement faction is winning the debate. EU knows that there is no alternative to engagement with Russia.

On Georgia, there is a re-evaluation going on. The state of emergency in November last year was seen largely as an unfortunate overreaction. Playing with missiles is going too far for most EU countries. There is disappointment with Sachasvili. The exception is the Eastern EU members who feel deep rooted solidarity with Georgia based on historic memories of their own.

It is most likely that the EU will continue to support Georgia (as during the Donor conference) but start increasingly to distance them from Sachasvili.

A dividing issue is NATO expansion and the US missile defense system. Generally New Europe supports NATO expansion while Old Europe does not. I expect that at the next NATO Council a diplomatic formulation will be found which affirms that Georgia and Ukraine can join one day but not now. Here much will depend on the post-election position of the US.

On the other hand the EU is realizing that the ENP-enlargement light- approach has not had the effect its designers had in mind. Here all options are now discussed, even (silently) the prospect of eventual (if very distant) EU membership.

3. What options are there for stability and security arrangements for Georgia as a result?

I would like to quote Sakasvili here, in a German TV interview ‘Wrong question, you should ask …’ . Seriously, the question should be what the options for stability and security in the whole region are, including for Russia and Europe. Security and Stability can only be achieved with all partners involved.

With the military option Sakashvili has gambled away any hope to re-integrate South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the medium term. The Russian recognition leaves these territories in international limbo and under the direct influence of Moscow.

NATO is the wrong track. It is the track of the cold war. I think we have to dramatically rethink NATO and its relationship with Russia.

Can this be a revival of OSCE? Medvedev is calling for a new Security architecture. Why not take him by his word and explore what this means? Simply accepting a Russian proposal for discussion would be a positive sign.

My view is that the EU should accept the Russian proposal for debate. It may be a last chance to build in our values before Europe and the US influence in the world further declines.

Some concluding remarks :

Let's look at Georgia, Russia and the separatist entities separately for a moment

Georgia:
Something went seriously wrong here. After a good start and many good reforms, Sakashvili lost it. Despite warnings he opted for a military solution of a frozen conflict. He gave Russia the chance to demonstrate where the red lines are.
Georgia is a big looser of this conflict: it probably lost option to join NATO, lost South Ossetia and Abkhazia for the foreseeable future and will have to rebuild a trusted relationship with the EU.
I see the following priorities :
o Economic reconstruction and social development is priority + integration of refugees. This is where the EU should concentrate support.
o Now it is important to make sure that Georgia does not re-militarize.
o Government needs to reopen dialogue with civil society, and engage in CS confidence building.
o High level corruption should be made an issue, especially in relation to militarization and the military budget.
o Useful to put in place an independent investigation into the conflict, and probably also think about transitional justice.
o Think about post-Sakashvili period and how not to loose the momentum for further transition to an open society

Russia:
No question that Russia had a hand in creating this conflict. However, both Putin and Sakhasvili wanted to force it. Russia handled badly, luckily for Sachasvili.
Russia achieved its main goals: NATO membership pf Georgia is probably off the table, and West has to recognize Russia’s regional and global ambitions.
Conflict and Russia's reaction put the question of the future European security structure on the agenda. I think it would be useful to discuss this with the Russians.

Frozen Conflicts:
Depends who you ask, but at least there is some movement in the discussion. The link to Kosovo makes everything very complicated.
Need to explore what all this means for future of international law
At least all parties should agree that military option is not an option.
Apparent exclusion from Donors spending is a mistake. It recognizes that the territories are lost and pushes them further under Russian influence.

EU:
East is back, ENP on agenda
Russia, need for new, more mature relationship, does not mean giving up values, but need for a value driven interest policy
Re-think cold war and post-cold war arrangements. My sense is that NATO is in decline and OSCE needs a relaunch or is dead. Why not explore what the Russians mean by European Security Structures, engage, change it and give feeling to Russia that they have launched something with EU and others coming on board.
Interesting what EU position on NATO will mean for relationship with US. Likely that under McCain more difficult. But also possible that he will push New/Old Europe agenda. We should manage a more cooperative position of the US.

GreenTrabi and the Eco-Economic Revolution

The global car industry is in recesssion. Most German car manufacturers are already working in forced holiday mode. What a great moment to think anticyclical and launch a new car. Or relaunch a true vintage car, the Trabant.

Why? The Trabant is one of the most successful mass produced cars of all times. It was a real Volkswagen (people's car), it was small, simple (it could actually be repaired), durable (most kept going for 20 years), timeless design, had an ecological side (the chassis was made of some kind of recycable cardboard material, while the engine was a real ecological disaster). And of course it achived historic fame as the mobility symbol of the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall. What other car brand can claim a similar status. Are these not enough reasons for a relaunch of the Trabant?

What should the new Trabi be and look like?
The new Trabi should be based on the key values of the original Trabant: simple- small- recycable- durable- timeless design- cheap (7000 Euro would be a good target)- Made in (East) Germany.

In addition, and crucially important, the new Trabi should push the limits of eco-economic technology and design. The new Trabant will be GreenTrabi.

The GreenTrabi will be the Volkswagen of the 2010s. And as the Volkswagen Kaefer was the symbol of the German economic miracle of the 1950s, the GreenTrabi could be a symbol of the German eco-econmic miracle of the 2010s.

The GreenTrabi concept has nothing in common with the idea of the miniatur model company Herpa to produce 5000 limited edition New Trabis for a retail price of 50,000 Euro each.

What's next? Let's find an investor who puts his money into the GreenTrabi car revolution. And let's launch the idea in 2009, 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. 1989 was the year of the peaceful revolution to a capitalist society. The capitalist system now needs a eco-economic revolution and the GreenTrabi could become another revolutionary symbol.